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Immigrants, Cultural Differences, and Trade
Costs
Bedassa Tadesse* and Roger White**
ABSTRACT
We examine the effects of immigrants and cross-societal cultural differences on bilateral trade
costs using two alternative measures of cultural differences (i.e. cultural distance and genetic
distance). We find that bilateral trade costs generally increase with a rise in the cultural dis-
tance between trading partners but fall with a rise in the stock of immigrants. This implies that
immigrants counter bilateral trade costs that are associated with greater cultural differences.
Our observation is relevant from both migration and trade policy perspectives as it provides
further evidence that immigrants serve as conduits for bridging cultural differences, facilitate
international transactions, and enhance global economic integration.
INTRODUCTION
International trade involves interactions across borders and between cultures, and culture influences
how people think, communicate, and behave (Salacuse, 2005). Cultural differences may thus affect
the nature and costs of international transactions. Both anecdotal evidence and results from empiri-
cal studies indicate that cross-societal cultural differences have a negative influence on bilateral
trade flows (see, for example, Disdier et al., 2010; Tadesse and White, 2010a; White and Tadesse,
2008 and Linders et al., 2005). Given the inverse relationship between trade costs and the volume
of trade, it can therefore be inferred that, all else being equal, greater cultural differences between
country pairs correspond with higher trade-related transaction costs.
A growing literature documents that immigrants have the ability to serve as conduits for bridging
cultural differences by providing critical information about markets, consumer preferences, and
business practices that are often costly to obtain (Peri and Requena, 2009; Blanes-Cristobal, 2008;
Girma and Yu, 2002).1 These observations suggest that immigrants may have the potential to coun-
ter, either in whole or in part, increases in trade costs that stem from cross-societal cultural differ-
ences. Direct examination of this relationship, however, has been hindered by a lack of data on
bilateral trade costs and, to some degree, by the absence of reliable measure of cultural differences,
thus creating a void in the literature.
Using comprehensive ad valorem tariff equivalent estimates of bilateral trade costs and two alter-
native measures of cross-societal cultural differences – specifically, the cultural distance and the
genetic distance between populations in immigrants’ home and host countries – we attempt to fill
the void in the related literature by examining whether immigrants offset the rise in trade costs
associated with cultural differences and, if so, the extent to which the effect varies along the low
and high ends of the cultural divergence contour. White (2010) defines cultural distance as
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“differences in the behavior, beliefs, arts, institutions, and all other avenues by which a population,
community, or a class collectively expresses its values and attitudes”.2 Genetic distance refers to “
. . . the divergence in the whole set of implicit beliefs, customs, habits, biases, conventions, etc. that
are transmitted across generations – biologically and/or culturally – with high persistence” (Spo-
laore and Wacziarg, 2009).3 Our use of cultural distance and genetic distance as alternative mea-
sures of cultural differences makes our approach novel and our findings comprehensive, as the
observed effects can be directly compared.
Our results, obtained from interchangeably using both measures of cultural differences, indicate
that bilateral trade costs tend to rise as cultural differences widen and fall with increases in the
immigrant stock. The observed effect of immigrants on bilateral trade costs, however, increases
with a rise in cultural differences. It can therefore be inferred that the extent to which immigrants
offset bilateral trade costs attributable to cultural differences is higher the more culturally divergent
are the home and the host countries. Accordingly, we find that, all else being equal, a one per cent
increase in cultural differences, as measured by cultural distance between the typical pair of home
and host countries, is associated with a 0.1103 per cent average increase in bilateral trade costs,
with the marginal trade cost-reducing effects of immigrants (in absolute terms) rising from 0.0707
per cent to 0.0735 per cent as we move from the lowest to the highest observed points on the cul-
tural distance contour. Similarly, using genetic distance as our proxy measure of cultural differ-
ences, we find that a one per cent increase in genetic distance between the typical home and host
country pairs is associated with 0.0714 per cent (on average) increase in bilateral trade costs, with
the marginal trade cost-reducing effects of immigrants rising from 0.0698 per cent to 0.110 per cent
as we move from the lowest to highest observed points of the genetic distance contour.
We also find that the observed influences of both immigrants and cross-societal cultural differ-
ences persist across trade costs involving manufactures and agricultural products. Given the persis-
tence of the observed effects across product categories, our observation of relatively greater
marginal trade cost-reducing effects of immigrants, specifically among home and host country pairs
that are culturally more divergent, has important implications for two reasons. First, in the face of
declining trade costs associated with geographic distance, as developing countries continue to face
significant hurdles in integrating with in the global economy and internalizing the benefits of inter-
national trade, our observation implies that immigrants may play a significant role in enhancing the
economic integration of their home countries with the rest of the world. Second, as is noted by
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013), given that inherited human characteristics transmitted from one gen-
eration to the next over the long run affect economic outcomes, our observation implies that the
existing literature underestimates the significance of the economic influences attributable to
immigrants.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the relevant literature. In Sec-
tion 3, we discuss the empirical specifications, variables, and sources of our data. Section 4 dis-
cusses our estimation results and their policy implications. Section 5 concludes.
RELEVANT LITERATURE
While few studies examine the direct influence of cultural differences on trade costs, several works
indirectly address the relationship. Boisso and Ferrantino (1997), for example, employ linguistic
distance as a proxy for cultural differences and examine the corresponding effect on bilateral trade
flows. While they find that greater cultural dissimilarity is negatively associated with the volume of
bilateral trade flows, the authors control neither for the effects of immigrants on trade flows nor for
their abilities to potentially offset the trade-inhibiting effects of cultural differences. Dunlevy (2006)
uses a dummy variable representing the commonality of official languages to address the effect of
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cultural similarity on trade flows between the US and a number of immigrants’ home countries.
Using the observation of relatively higher positive influences of immigrants on US exports to home
countries that use English or Spanish as an official language, Dunlevy asserts that immigrants coun-
ter the trade-inhibiting effects of cultural differences.4
More recent studies have examined the effects of cultural differences on trade flows by employ-
ing direct measures of cultural dissimilarity constructed using survey data and the flows of goods
and services that embed and transmit culture. Cyrus (2012), for example, investigates the link
between culture and bilateral trade by augmenting data from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics
with a single measure of cultural distance computed using data from the World Values Survey
(WVS). Applying the gravity model to 90 countries, the author reports that culturally-distant coun-
try pairs trade less, implying that cultural distance imposes costs on trade that exceed corresponding
opportunities for trade based on increased variety. Similarly, Tadesse and White (2010a) use WVS
data to construct a measure of cultural distance that they describe as representative of cross-societal
differences in shared norms, beliefs, traditions, and values. The authors examine the effects of cul-
tural differences and immigrants on US state-level exports to 75 home countries and find that while
state-level exports increase with a rise in the number of immigrants that reside in each state, greater
cultural distance between the US and the immigrants’ home countries corresponds with reduced
export levels. Thus, the authors conclude that immigrants counter, at least in part, the export-
inhibiting effects of cultural distance. In a related study, Tadesse and White (2010b) examine trade
flows among nine OECD countries and 67 home countries and find greater cultural distance
imposes economically significant and statistically-consistent negative effects on the intensive mar-
gins of trade both at aggregate and disaggregate levels. Most closely associated with the work pre-
sented here, examining the direct effects immigrants on bilateral trade costs, Tadesse and White
(2015) find robust evidence indicating that immigrants reduce trade-related transaction costs.
Presenting “bilateral preferences” as a function of cultural proximity between trading partners,
Disdier et al. (2009) argue that the use of trade in goods that embed and transmit culture has the
advantages of larger changes over time as compared with cultural distance measures computed
from a survey data. Thus, using trade in cultural goods as a proxy measure of cultural differences
and examining its effects on bilateral trade flows, the authors report that cultural similarity has a
positive and statistically significant influence on the volume of bilateral trade flows.
While relatively recent, using genetic distance as a proxy measure, examining the effects of cul-
ture differences on economic activity is not entirely new. Gorodnichenko and Roland (2010), for
example, employ genetic distance data as an instrumental variable for the Hofstede (1980) cultural
dimension of ‘Individualism vs. Collectivism’ and examine how individualism affects per-worker
income, total factor productivity, and innovation. Guiso et al. (2009) employ genetic distance
among European nations as a proxy measure of interpersonal trust. Examining its influence on
bilateral trade flows, the authors find that a one standard deviation change in genetic distance corre-
sponds with a 27 per cent reduction in the value of cross-border economic exchange.5 Arguing that
variation in migratory distance to various settlements across the globe affects genetic diversity and,
thus, reflects the trade-off between the beneficial and the detrimental effects of diversity on produc-
tivity, Ashraf and Galor (2013) indicate that genetic diversity has a persistent hump-shaped effect
on the economic development of African countries.
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009 and 2013) employ genetic distance data to examine its influence
on technology diffusion and economic development. Examining the influence of genetic distance
on societies’ positioning relative to the technological frontier, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) find
strong evidence supporting the view that populations that are historically and culturally farther from
innovators face greater hurdles to imitate and adopt new technologies due to the high costs of
transactions associated with differences in values and norms, mistrust, and miscommunication. Dis-
cussing how inherited human characteristics (transmitted from one generation to the next within
populations over the long run) affect economic outcomes, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) emphasize
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the importance of focusing on populations rather than locations to understand the persistence and
reversal of fortunes, and the spread of economic development.
While we point to the use of genetic distance, in a broad sense, and its ability to capture differ-
ences between populations that persist over generations as a justification for our use of genetic dis-
tance to represent cross-societal cultural differences, given the unsettled nature of the extent to
which genetics determines culture, we also employ cultural distance – a related but time-varying
measure – to address our question of primary interest: Does the influence of immigrants, in terms
of reducing trade costs, rise with cultural difference? In this endeavour, our study is the first to
simultaneously and directly examine the effects of cultural differences and immigrants on bilateral
trade costs. Given the contentious and political nature of issues that immigration policy presents in
many countries, our findings offer information that is directly relevant for public policy. Further, as
trade costs are relevant both from the perspectives of consumers and firms, by providing a better
understanding of the effects of culture differences on commercial relationships, our study paves
ways for the formulation of commercial policy instruments.
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION, DATA, AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION
Due to a lack of data on bilateral trade costs, using trade flows as their dependent variable series
and measures of cultural differences and immigrants as control variables, previous studies have
examined the potential trade-inhibiting effect of cultural differences. These studies broadly indicate
that while an increase in the immigrant stock increases bilateral trade flows, greater cultural dis-
tance between the immigrants’ home and host countries leads to a fall in the volume of trade flows
both at the intensive and extensive margins. However, given that trade costs are not used as the
dependent variable series, the results from these studies fail to corroborate the hypothesis that cul-
tural distance increases trade costs. They also fail to substantiate the notion that immigrants offset
trade costs associated with cultural differences. Thus, beyond the indirect inference that through
their pro-trade effects immigrant may partially or fully counter the trade cost-increasing effects of
cultural dissimilarity, the existing literature (in which trade flows were used as the dependent vari-
able series) doesn’t indicate the degree to which cultural differences increase trade costs or the
extent to which immigrants counter the corresponding effects.
We overcome this shortcoming of the existing literature by using the first ad valorem tariff
equivalent comprehensive estimates of bilateral trade costs involving 166 country pairs – of which
19 are OECD countries that host immigrants from the other OECD countries and from 147 non-
OECD home countries – during the period from 1995 through 2010. The data are from Arvis et al.
(2013) who derive the estimates using the inverse form of the gravity model while incorporating
information on each country’s bilateral export and import flows with domestic production levels.6
Immigrant stock data are from the OECD (2015). All other variables, with the exception of the cul-
tural distance and genetic distance measures, to be discussed below, are from the CEPII Gravity
database (CEPII, 2015).
The cultural distance measure
Our measure of the cultural distance between each of the host and its trading partner home coun-
tries in our sample is computed following Tadesse and White (2010a) using data from the WVS.
Conducted between 1998 and 2010, the WVS questionnaires elicit respondents’ views on a wide
variety of topics. Factor analysis is then employed to categorize responses (and, thus, respondents)
along two dimensions of culture: Survival vs. Self-expression values (SSE) and Traditional vs. Sec-
ular-rational authority (TSR). Together, the dimensions explain more than 70 per cent of the cross-
cultural variance on scores of specific values (Inglehart and Baker, 2000).
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Societies that are characterized as more survival-oriented commonly emphasize hard work and
self-denial and seek to achieve economic and physical security. Often, individuals in these societies
hold the perception that foreigners and outsiders are threatening and view ethnic diversity and cul-
tural change very negatively. This corresponds, for example, with an intolerance of homosexuals
and minorities as well as an adherence to traditional gender roles. Such societies are often charac-
terized by general authoritarian political outlooks. Societies that place greater emphasis on self-
expression values, however, hold opposing views. The rationale is that when economic security
and physical security are commonplace, cultural diversity begins to be appreciated and sought out.
This cultivates tolerance towards deviations from traditional gender roles and sexual norms as well
as greater support for equal rights.
On the other hand, more traditional societies tend to show greater deference to the authority of
the nation, a god, or family. In fact, such deference is viewed as important or as a general expecta-
tion. In these societies, it is common for individuals to adhere to family or communal obligations,
to express a high degree of national pride and/or to have a nationalistic outlook, and to show obe-
dience to religious authority. Furthermore, large families are common, as large numbers of children
are viewed as a positive or desirable achievement, and fertility rates tend to be high, while divorce,
abortion, euthanasia, suicide are all viewed negatively. Societies that are more secular-
rational-focused generally hold opposing views from those of individuals in traditional societies.
Often, individuals in secular-rational societies adhere to rational-legal norms and emphasize
economic accumulation and individual achievement.
Using the TSR and SSE values, we compute a time-varying measure of the cultural distance
(CDISTijt) between each of the home and host countries in our study as the square root of the
squared average of the sum of the differences between the respective values between the corre-
sponding host and home country pairs: CDISTijt ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
TSRjt  TSRit
 2 þ SSEjt  SSEit 2
q
. Given
that the data used to compute the corresponding measures have been updated from the WVS corre-
sponding to the years, 1995-1998, 1999-2004, 2005-2008, and 2010-2012, while not necessarily
annual, the resulting cultural distance measures are time-varying.7
The genetic distance measure
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) suggest that human genetic distance can be viewed as a summary
measure of very long-term divergence in traits that are inter-generationally transmitted across popu-
lations. Using Nei’s (1972) approach, the authors compute their measure of the genetic distance
(GDxy) between two populations, x and y, as Dij =  ln(I), where the genetic identity (I), for any
single locus with n alleles is calculated as Jxyffiffiffiffiffiffi
JxJy
p . In the specification, Jx ¼
Pn
i¼1 q
2
ix, Jy ¼
Pn
i¼1 q
2
iy
and Jxy ¼
Pn
i¼1 qixqiy are, respectively, the arithmetic means of the normalized identity of genes
(i.e. a kinship coefficient) between populations x and y over all loci. The variables qix and qiy rep-
resent the frequencies of the ith alleles for populations x and y, respectively. Accordingly, if x and
y have identical allele frequencies, I will be equal to 1, and if x and y share no alleles at all, then I
will equal 0, making the measure of genetic distance between populations in two countries to range
in value from 0 (for identical populations) to infinity (for entirely dissimilar populations).
According to Nei (1972), genetic variation between populations can result from genetic drift, iso-
lation of populations, and selective pressures impacting genetic loci of populations. Thus, we argue
that, reflective of a divergence in expectations and preferences of individuals and societies in differ-
ent countries, greater cultural differences (i.e. genetic distance) may be associated with higher trans-
action costs. However, it is important to note that historically many countries have had mixed
ethnicities. The growth in immigration, specifically during recent decades, also implies that several
countries have become ethnically, and therefore genetically, more diverse, making the extent to
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which genetics determines culture vary significantly across different populations. In addition,
despite the presence of a strong correlation between the genetic distance and cultural distance vari-
ables, which we use as alternative measures of cultural differences, given the persistent nature of
cultural differences as represented by genetic distance and the temporal nature of the differences
captured by cultural distance, the degree to which both measures reflect the effects of cultural dif-
ferences on economic activity may vary.
The empirical model and control variables
To address our research question, we estimate a regression of the bilateral trade costs between the
pairings of home and host countries in our sample while controlling for our variables of interest.
The dependent variable series, TCijt, includes three different measures of ad valorem tariff equiva-
lent trade costs: i) the costs of trade faced by exporters or importers in country i during year t that
are associated with trading all products, and the disaggregated values corresponding with trading ii)
manufactured goods and iii) agricultural products. Equation (1) summarizes our empirical model.
lnTCijt ¼ a0 þ b1lnCDijt þ b2lnIMijt þ b3ðlnCDijtlnIMijtÞ þ bxxijt þ ijt ð1Þ
Of primary interest are the signs, relative magnitudes, and statistical significance of b1, b2, and
b3 – the coefficients of the variables representing the logs of cultural differences (as measured by
cultural distance or genetic distance), lnCDijt, the stocks of immigrants, lnIMijt, and their interaction
term (lnCDijt 9 lnIMijt). Following the literature that examines the effects of the respective vari-
ables on the volume of bilateral trade flows, a priori we expect the coefficients of the cultural dis-
tance and immigrant stock variable to be positive (b1 > 0) and negative (b2 < 0), respectively,
indicating that, all else being equal, a rise in cross-societal cultural dissimilarities corresponds with
higher trading costs and that a greater immigrant stock corresponds with a fall in bilateral trade
costs. The coefficient of the interaction term, however, may take positive (b3 > 0) or negative
(b3 < 0) values depending on the relative magnitudes of the trade cost-increasing effect of cultural
differences and the corresponding trade cost-reducing effect of the immigrant stock.
Our specification has an added benefit in that it enables us to quantify the marginal trade cost reduc-
tion effects of the immigrant stock at various levels of cultural differences and, hence, to identify
whether the observed effect rises or falls as cultural difference increases from its lowest to highest
values.8
The vector X includes additional explanatory variables that, theoretically, influence bilateral
trade costs. Included among these control variables are measures of transportation costs, GDij,
which are represented by the geodesic distance between trading partners (CEPII, 2014), and eco-
nomic remoteness, REMit, which is included to represent multilateral resistance. The economic
remoteness variable is calculated, following Head and Ries (1998) and using World Bank (2014)
data, as REMit ¼ 1=
PK
k¼1½ðYkt=YwtÞ=GDjk, where Ywt is gross world product, and k identifies
potential non-country j trading partners for country i.9 An analogous variable is included in our
empirical specification to represent country j’s economic remoteness. To account for additional
geographic impediments to bilateral trade, we also include two dummy variables (LLKi and LLKj)
that identify whether immigrants’ home and host countries, respectively, are landlocked. Addi-
tionally, to control for the effects of variables that theoretically are expected to lower trade costs,
we include four dummy variables that indicate whether the trading partners share a common bor-
der (CBDij), have a common language (LNGij), have (or had) a colonial relationship (COLij), or
are parties to one or more multilateral trade agreement (MTAij). Data for all of the six dummy
variables are obtained from the CEPII (2015). Table 1 presents summaries of the descriptive
statistics for all variables.
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To gain a better understanding of the determinants of the bilateral trade cost series, we start our
discussion by looking at the descriptive statistics presented in Table 1. Of particular interest are the
average values of bilateral trade costs, cultural distance, genetic distance, and the stocks of immi-
grants. The average ad valorem tariff equivalent total bilateral trade costs between the typical pair
of host and home countries is 203.81 per cent, with the corresponding mean values for trade in
manufactured and agricultural goods being 195.13 per cent and 264.58 per cent respectively. This
indicates that, on average, trade in agricultural products is typically subject to significantly higher
trade costs than manufactured goods. Varying from 0.0721 to 4.6852, the average cultural distance
measure between two pairs of the trading partners in our study is estimated at 2.174. The average
number of immigrants from a given home country that reside in the typical OECD host country is
44,547. Additionally, ranging from as low as 0 (no genetic differences) to 522.43 (the maximum
value for the countries in our sample), the average weighted Nei genetic distance between the typi-
cal host and home countries in our sample is 135.29.
Looking at the control variables, we find that the typical host-home country pair is, on average,
about 7,039 kilometers apart, with the average values for the multilateral resistance terms (i.e. the
economic remoteness variables) being 5,334.04 for the typical home country and 3,556.43 for the
typical host country. We also see that 19.01 per cent of the home countries in our sample are land-
locked while only 10.75 per cent of the host countries lack direct access to a sea port. Further,
about 2.3 per cent of the home and host country pairs in our sample share a common border, 11.58
per cent have a common official language(s), 4.62 per cent of the home and host country pairs had
(or have) colonial relationships, and about 22.6 per cent of the pairs are parties to one or more
mutual trade agreements that are expected to contribute to reduced bilateral trade costs.
ESTIMATION RESULTS
We estimate equation (1) using panel fixed and random effects approaches and the multilevel mixed
effects random coefficients model. We report results obtained from the panel random effects general-
ized least squares approach.10 To account for variability in both bilateral trade costs and the stocks of
immigrants across the home-host country pairs in different regions – hence, the potential sensitivity
of the results – we also employ the multilevel mixed effects random coefficient model and use the
corresponding results as a robustness check. Starting with the bare-bone version of our model and
sequentially adding our variables of interest and their interaction term, we estimate several iterations
of equation (1). First, with the notion that while cultures may gradually change over time (particularly
given the increasing integration of world economies), we address our question by using the time-
varying composite measure of cultural differences, calculated from the various waves of the WVS
data (Inglehart et al., 2004).11 Then, we address our question by replacing the time-varying cultural
distance measure with our measure of genetic distance. Table 2 and Table 3 present results obtained
when using the respective measures of cultural differences. Column (a) of both tables presents results
obtained when estimating the bare-bone version of our regression model. Corresponding results
obtained when considering variation in the influences of our measures of cultural differences and the
stocks of immigrants, with and without the interaction term between each of the cultural difference
measures and the immigrant stock variable, are presented in columns (b) through (d).
Do immigrants offset the influence of cultural differences on bilateral trade costs?
Looking across the specifications at the coefficients of the cultural distance variable, we find that,
regardless of the measure of trade costs evaluated and the specification used, the variable retains a
consistently positive and statistically significant coefficient, although with some variation in
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magnitude. For simplicity, using the results presented in column (b) of the respective dependent
variable series, for instance, given the double-log nature of the variables that enter our specification,
we can say that, all else being equal, a one per cent increase in the cultural distance between the
typical host and home countries in our sample corresponds with a 0.152 per cent increase in bilat-
eral trade costs for all products, 0.172 per cent for manufactured goods, and 0.079 per cent for
agricultural products. On the other hand, looking at the coefficients of the immigrant stock variable
presented in column (c), we find an assumed one per cent increase in the stocks of immigrants, all
else being equal, is associated with a 0.730 per cent decrease in aggregate bilateral trade costs, a
0.806 per cent decrease in trade costs involving manufactures, and a 0.097 per cent decrease in
trade costs involving agricultural products.
Comparing the magnitudes of the coefficients of both the cultural distance and the immigrants
stocks across the various specifications, we see that the corresponding effects of both variables
remain consistent in terms of the sign of the respective coefficients (positive for the cultural dis-
tance variable and negative for the immigrant stock variable); however, the magnitude of the coeffi-
cients change, indicating the sensitivity of their influences to the absolute magnitude of the other
variable. Thus, in column (d), we present results obtained from our fully specified model in which
both variables and their interaction term are included. The results indicate that the coefficients of
both variables retain their respective signs and the statistical significance that is observed from the
specifications in which the interaction term was not included. The coefficients of the interaction
term are also significantly different from zero.12
The sign of the coefficient of the interaction term, however, differs across the sectors considered.
While it is negative for aggregate trade costs and manufactures, it is positive for agricultural prod-
ucts. Accordingly, taking the signs and the coefficients of the interaction term into account, we esti-
mate the average effect of a one per cent increase in cultural distance on the bilateral trade costs, at
the mean of the stocks of immigrants from the typical home in the typical host, in our study as
0.110 per cent for aggregate trade costs, 0.068 per cent for trade costs involving manufactures, and
0.814 per cent for agricultural products. For immigrant stocks, the corresponding effects are esti-
mated at 0.074 per cent at the aggregate level, 0.0838 per cent for manufactures, and 0.053 per
cent for agricultural products.13
Turning to the coefficients of the control variables in Table 2, we observe that greater geodesic
distance correlates with higher bilateral trade costs both at the aggregate level (column (a)) and
across the sectors considered: manufactures (column (f)) and agricultural products (column (k)).
Likewise, compared with home or host countries that have access to the sea, bilateral trade costs
are higher among country pairs where one (or both) is landlocked. Increased levels of home coun-
try economic remoteness (i.e. multilateral resistance) are associated with higher trade costs. For host
countries, however, the observed effect of increased multilateral resistance is not consistently posi-
tive in that, in a few instances, we observe higher values of economic remoteness corresponding
with a fall in bilateral trade costs. Consistent with theoretical expectations, we also find that country
pairs which share a common official language(s), a common border, or are parties to a bilateral or
multilateral trading agreement(s) have lower bilateral trade costs than country pairs which do not
share these attributes. The coefficient estimates of the dummy variable that indicates past colonial
relationships are also consistently negative and statistically significant, indicating that, relative to
country pairs that do(did) not have the relationships, bilateral trade costs are lower among those
that have (or had) such a relationship.
Finally, given the recent emphasis placed on using cultural differences to explore the differences
in economic outcomes and its persistence across countries, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) stress the
need to focus on populations rather than locations. Taking their point into account, we estimate our
specification by replacing the composite measure of cultural distance with the genetic distance vari-
able. Table 3 presents the corresponding results.
Immigrants, Cultural Differences, and Trade Costs 11
© 2016 The Authors. International Migration © 2016 IOM
Consistent with our observations from using cultural distance as a proxy measure of cultural dif-
ferences, results in the table indicate that both at aggregate and sector levels a rise in cultural differ-
ences as measured by genetic distance among the populations in the home and host countries is
associated with a rise in bilateral trade costs, and increases in the immigrant stock from a given
home residing in a given host is associated with a fall in bilateral trade costs. In addition to almost
all of the control variables maintaining the previously observed effects, using results from the fully-
specified model (column (d)), we find that, all else being constant, the elasticity of bilateral trade
costs with respect to genetic distance (computed at the mean of the immigrant stock variable)
0.071 per cent, 0.0667 per cent and 1.176 at the aggregate level, manufactures and agricultural
products, respectively. Likewise, the corresponding elasticity bilateral trade costs with respect to
the immigrant stocks (at the mean of the genetic distance) are found to be 0.146 per cent,
0.149 per cent, and 0.010 per cent, respectively.14
Do immigrants reduce bilateral trade costs at all levels of cultural differences?
Consistent with our expectation and the literature, our results indicate that cross-societal cultural
differences, measured by both cultural distance (i.e. a temporal measure) and by genetic dis-
tance (i.e. a persistent measure), on average, are associated with a rise in trade-related transac-
tion costs. We also find that immigrants reduce bilateral trade costs between their home and
host countries. The ability of immigrants to reduce bilateral trade costs, however, can be split
into two: (i) their capacity to bridge cultural differences (e.g. languages and knowledge of
home country business practices), and (ii) provision of information necessary for matching
exporters and importers, networks suitable for the initiation and completion of trade deals, and
contract enforcement (especially when informal contracting is commonplace). The relatively con-
sistent trade costs reduction effects of immigrants observed from both measures should not be
surprising.
Nonetheless, the composition of immigrants from a given home country that reside in a given
host country and the cross-societal cultural differences that increase transaction costs may vary sub-
stantially across countries, especially when considering the differences in the push and pull factors
associated with migration, and the values, beliefs and opinions of people in various enclaves. As a
result, when comparing the extent to which immigrants reduce the trade costs associated with cul-
tural differences between their home and host countries, considerable variation in the effects should
be expected at various thresholds of the cultural difference “contour”.15 Thus, we ask: Do immi-
grants reduce bilateral trade costs at all levels of cultural differences? Given that our estimation
equation (1) includes an interaction term between our measures of cultural distance and the immi-
grant stock variable, we examine the pattern of the observed effects by estimating the marginal
effects of immigrants on bilateral trade costs at various levels (contours) of both of our cultural dif-
ference measures. Table 4 presents the corresponding effects for the aggregate (i.e. overall or total)
and sector-specific bilateral trade costs using the fully-specified version of our model for each of
the dependent variable series.
Results presented in Table 4 indicate that, both at the aggregate level and across the sectors con-
sidered, the marginal bilateral trade costs reduction effects of immigrants remain consistently signif-
icant at various thresholds of our cultural difference measures. Further, while relatively lower when
using our genetic distance measure, the magnitudes (in absolute terms) of the observed effects rise
with a rise in the level of cultural differences as measured by the respective variables. Accordingly,
all else being constant, the marginal trade cost-reducing effects of a one per cent increase in the
stock of immigrants rises from 0.0707 per cent to 0.735 per cent as the natural logs of our time
varying measure of cultural difference (cultural distance) rises from its lowest value (2.62) to its
highest value (1.38). Likewise, the corresponding effect on trade costs involving manufactures rises
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from rises from 0.073 per cent to 0.082 per cent; however, for agricultural products, the effect
diminishes from 0.141 per cent to 0.0406 per cent. When using genetic distance as well, with the
exception of agricultural products, where we find the observed effects falling as genetic distance
rises, both for the total trade and manufactures we find the bilateral trade cost-reduction effects of
immigrants lower at the lower end of the cultural difference contour and higher at the upper end of
the contour.
Two important inferences can be gleaned from these results. First, the observation that higher
bilateral trade costs generally correlate with greater cultural differences indicates that at higher
levels of cultural distance the proportion of total trade costs due to cultural differences is dominant.
Given their unique ability to bridge cultural differences, immigrants are able to reduce such costs.
Second, the corresponding effect of immigrants on trade costs involving agricultural products is
lower. Perhaps due to relative bulkiness, agricultural goods generally face higher transportation
costs. Agricultural products typically subject to relatively significant impediments (e.g. due to tariffs
and quotas, etc.), making the proportion of total trade costs attributable to factors other than cul-
tural differences higher. Also, while manufactures are often differentiated, agricultural products are
homogenous. Consequently, while the ability of immigrants to reduce the bilateral trade costs
involving agricultural products may persist, the observed effect may remain lower at higher levels
of cultural differences than at lower levels.
Robustness checks
To evaluate the robustness of our results, we compare our results with estimation results obtained
from an alternative estimation approach, the multilevel mixed effects model, which allows us to
account for variations in the bilateral trade costs structure of the trading partners. It should be noted
that our dependent variable series, the bilateral trade costs, and our measures of cultural differences,
are multi-dimensional, varying substantially both across broad geographic regions, countries (popu-
lations) within a region, and over time. While the random effects panel data model we estimate so
far accounts for the variation in trading costs across trading partners and the time dimension of our
data, it does not specifically account for the variances in the structure of trade costs arising from
regional clustering of the trading partners (i.e. differences in trade-orientation of the partners in var-
ious geographic regions). Thus, we follow the Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008) framework and
estimate our specification using a multilevel mixed effects model (i.e. random intercepts for regions
and countries pairs within each region, and random coefficients for the stocks of immigrants from
each home country in each host country).16 Table 5 presents the corresponding estimation results
for our fully specified model.
Indicating the robustness of our findings, results presented in Table 5 indicate that our conclu-
sions regarding the respective effects of cultural differences and the stock of immigrants on bilat-
eral trade costs remain unchanged even when we account for the variances in the trade cost
orientation of the trading partners. The trade cost-offsetting effects of an increase in the immigrant
stock from a typical home country that resides in a typical host country also remain unchanged.
Accordingly, we find that the marginal effects of a one per cent increase in the stock of immi-
grants, computed at the respective means of all other variables, corresponds with 0.0826 per cent,
0.090 per cent, and 0.039 per cent reductions (when using cultural distance) and 0.0825 per cent,
0.114 per cent, and 0.023 per cent reductions (when using genetic distance) in trade costs at aggre-
gate levels, and across the manufactures and agricultural products, respectively. While not statisti-
cally significant, it is, however, worthwhile to note that the marginal effects estimated the mixed
effects model (as compared to results from the panel random effects) are generally lower; this is so
because the model accounts for relative differences in the bilateral trade costs of the country pairs
and their regional locations.
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CONCLUSION
Culture profoundly influences how people think, communicate, and behave. It has the potential
to affect the kinds of transactions they make and the way they negotiate. Differences in culture
may, therefore, increase trade-related transaction costs, and/or create barriers that impede the
completion of trade deals. Given their potential to bridge cultural differences, immigrants, on the
other hand, may mediate the associated costs. Evaluating these relationships, we provide the first
direct empirical test of the influences of immigrants and cultural differences (measured using
alternative variables: cultural distance, a temporal measure, and genetic distance, a time-invariant
measure of cultural differences transmitted over generations) on bilateral trade costs. In addition
to capturing cultural differences extended over generations, our use of genetic distance as a proxy
for cultural differences permits the inclusion of a larger number of countries in the analysis as
compared to earlier works. However, given the unsettled nature of the extent to which genetics
affects culture, we also use cultural distance that permits temporal variation in the differences.
Thus, our approach is novel and our results are more comprehensive than related studies. While
we obtain results from the application of the standard random effects panel data estimation
approach, we assess their robustness by using results obtained from the application of a multi-
level mixed effects model that accounts for variation in the trade orientation of the countries in
our sample.
Examining the determinants of bilateral trade costs for 19 OECD member countries that host
immigrants from the respective OECD members and 147 non-OECD home countries for which
relevant data on stocks of immigrants covering the period from 1995 through 2010 are available,
we find that trade costs rise with cultural differences and decrease with increases in the stock of
immigrants. At the margin, the trade cost-reducing effects of immigrants are found to increase,
although at varying degrees, as we move from the lowest to highest observed values along the
cultural differences contour. The observed trade cost-reducing effects of immigrants hold both at
the aggregate level and across the sectors; however, considerable differences exist in the observed
patterns of immigrants’ marginal effects across the sectors: an increasing marginal effect is found
for manufactures and a decreasing effect is found for agricultural products. While this variation is,
perhaps the result of differences in the proportion of total trade costs attributable to cultural differ-
ences across the different sectors, the rise in the marginal trade cost-reduction effects of immi-
grants at higher levels of cultural divergence both at the aggregate level and for manufactures has
implications relevant for academic and practical purposes related to immigration and commercial
policies.
After controlling for the influence of trade resistance factors such as geographic differences, the
observation that trade costs rise with cultural differences indicates that even as economies become
more integrated, cultural differences still account for a significant amount of trade-related transac-
tion costs. Additionally, in the face of the declining trade costs associated with geographic distance
between countries, developing countries continue to face significant hurdles to internalize the bene-
fits of international trade. Thus, immigrants can potentially play a significant role in enhancing the
economic integration of their home countries with the rest of the world. That is, beyond providing
information, enforcing contracts, facilitating communication, and easing the difficulty involved in
the initiation and completion of trade deals, the ability of immigrants to bridge cultural differences
contributes to significant reductions in trade costs, particularly among home and host countries that
are culturally more divergent. Finally, as Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) note, given that inherited
human characteristics transmitted across generations have significant long-run economic implica-
tions, from a purely academic perspective, our finding that the marginal trade costs reduction
effects of immigrants is higher at higher levels of cultural differences implies that existing research,
which attributes the ability immigrants to increase trade flows to information provision and
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enforcement in lax contract environments fails to reflect fully the economic influences of immi-
grants. Future studies that quantify the extent of this and related effects may thus aid in shaping
the often contentious debate related to national immigration policies.
NOTES
1 These abilities may be critical for the initiation and completion of trade deals and for the enforcement of
contracts.
2 Desmet et al. (2006) show a strong and robust correlation between genetic distance and an index of cultural
differences computed using answers to questions on perceptions of life, family, religion, and morals from
the 2005 World Value Surveys.
3 In biological terms, genetic distance is a term used to describe the number of differences or mutations
between two sets of Y-chromosome DNA or mitochondrial DNA test results. A genetic distance of zero
implies an exact match. Taking this notion into account, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) state that genetic
distance measures the difference in gene distributions between two populations, where the genes under con-
siderations change randomly and are independent of selection pressure.
4 See Genc et al. (2011) and White and Tadesse (2011) for surveys of the literature on the immigrant-trade
relationship.
5 There is debate concerning the appropriateness of genetic distance as a proxy for cultural differences. For
example, Guiliano et al. (2014) argues that genetic distance is a proxy variable that represents transporta-
tion costs. Guiso et al. (2009), however, point to Desmet et al. (2006) who report that genetic distance is
strongly correlated with several measures of cultural distance.
6 Arvis et al. (2013) compute the bilateral trade costs as sij ¼
ffiffiffiffiffi
tij tji
tii tjj
q
 1 ¼ xiixiixijxji
 
xiixii
xijxji
  1
2ðr1Þ1, where sijis
geometric average comprehensive trade costs between countries i and j and tij and xij are trade costs from
countries i to j and country i’s consumption of products from country j, respectively, and r denotes the
elasticity of substitution.
7 Tadesse and White (2010a) provide extensive discussion of the resulting values.
8 This is particularly important as both the stock of immigrants from a given home that reside in a given host
and the cultural differences among different pairs of countries varies greatly. In addition, to check the con-
sistency of our results, we provide estimation results obtained from several alternative specifications of the
above model.
9 Internal distance, when k = j, is calculated as 0:4 ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiLand Massip (Head and Mayer, 2000).
10 We choose to rely on the random effects results as the Hausman test fails to reject the null hypothesis of
no correlation between the regressors and the effects, implying that home-host-country-specific effects are
adequately modeled by a random-effects model.
11 The data used to construct this measure of cultural distance are from the third (1995-1998), fourth (1999-
2004), and fifth (2005-2009) waves of the World Values Survey.
12 The test for joint significance is of the coefficients of a variable and its interaction term in the same specifi-
cation is given as z ¼ bb IMMGþbbðlnCDISTln IMMGÞffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
sqrtðVARðbb ln IMMGÞþVARðbbðlnCDISTln IMMGÞÞþ2COVARðbb ln IMMG ;bbðlnCDISTln IMMGÞÞ
q
13 Albeit minor but statistically insignificant changes in the coefficient of a few of the control variables, re-
scaling the immigrant stock variable using the population sizes of the home/host countries yield an almost
identical result. Evaluating for potential non-linearity of the effects, the coefficient of the quadratic term
(share of immigrant stock in the population) was not significantly (at p< 0.001) different from zero.
14 The total number of observation in the regressions using cultural distance are small due to the time varying
values of cultural distance data not being available for all countries in the data.
15 As both cultural distance and genetic distance are measured in natural logs, our use of the word “contour”
is intentional.
16 The composition of immigrants from a given home country who reside in a given host country may vary
due to self-selection (immigrants choosing which host to migrate to) and the criteria used by the host coun-
try in admitting immigrants from various home countries. The mixed effects random coefficients model
thus, enables us to account for variation in the potential effect of immigrants arising from differences in
their composition.
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APPENDIX
Country listing: Afghanistan, Albaniaa, Algeriaa, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentinaa, Arme-
niaa, Australiaa,b, Austriaa,b, Azerbaijana, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesha, Barbados, Belarusa, Bel-
gium and Luxembourga, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazila, Brunei Darussalam,
Bulgariaa, Burkina Fasoa, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canadaa,b, Cape Verde, Central African
Republic, Chad, Chilea, Chinaa, Colombiaa, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatiaa, Cuba, Cyprusa,
Czech Republica, Co^te d’Ivoire, Denmarka,b, Dominica, Dominican Republica, Ecuador, Egypta, El
Salvadora, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estoniaa, Ethiopiaa, Fiji, Finlanda,b, Francea,b, Gabon, Gam-
bia, Georgiaa, Germanya,b, Ghanaa, Greecea, Grenada, Guatemalaa, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras,
Hong Konga, Hungarya, Icelanda, Indiaa, Indonesiaa, Irana, Iraqa, Irelanda,b, Israela, Italya,b, Jamaica,
Japana,b, Jordana, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea (Rep. of)a, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstana, Lao Peo-
ple’s Democratic Republic, Latviaa, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuaniaa, Luxembourga,b, Mace-
donia (the Former Yugoslav Rep. of)a, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysiaa, Maldives, Malia, Maltaa,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexicoa, Moldova (Rep. of)a, Mongolia, Moroccoa, Mozambique, Namibia,
Nepal, Netherlandsa,b, New Zealanda, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeriaa, Norwaya,b, Oman, Pakistana,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Perua, Philippinesa, Polanda, Portugala,b, Qatar, Russian
Federationa, Rwandaa, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabiaa, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singaporea, Slo-
vakiaa, Sloveniaa, South Africaa, Spaina,b, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Swedena,b, Switzer-
landa,b, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania (United Rep. of)a, Thailanda, Togo, Tonga,
Trinidad and Tobagoa, Tunisia, Turkeya, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukrainea, United Arab Emirates,
United Kingdoma,b, United States of Americaa,b, Uruguaya, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuelaa, Viet
Nama, Yemen, Zambiaa, and Zimbabwe.
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Trade costs data are available for all countries listed. Genetic distance data are available for all
listed countries except the Maldives, Sao Tome and Principe, and Yemen. The superscript “a”
denotes availability of both genetic distance data (from Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009 and 2011)
and cultural distance data (from the World Values Survey), while the superscript “b” identifies
OECD member host countries.
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